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Is a Financial Crisis a Trauma? 
Paul Crosthwaite 
 
The term “traumatic” has no other sense than an economic one. 
– Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 
 
Is a financial crisis a trauma? More hangs on this question than might at first appear, for 
if, as I hope to demonstrate, the answer is yes, then profound implications follow for 
issues of major importance in critical thought, including the power of symbolic systems 
to shape experience and material conditions, the challenge of representing disastrous 
events, and the status of the much-vaunted “return of the Real.” To acknowledge a 
financial crisis as being a trauma, in the particular sense I articulate in this essay, is to 
overturn conventional assumptions about the relationship between the material and the 
immaterial in social life. 
It is common, of course, for media commentators to refer to financial crises – 
from the Great Crash of 1929 to the Black Monday crash of 1987 to the “credit crunch” 
of recent years – as traumas. Academic experts in individual and collective trauma – 
psychologists, psychoanalysts, social scientists, historians – also frequently analyze 
financial upheavals in these terms. In National Trauma and Collective Memory (1998), 
for example, the sociologist Arthur G. Neal observes that “the initial jolt to the economic 
system [that] came with the stock market crash of October 24, 1929” meant that “the 
initial trauma of the Great Depression fell disproportionately upon the more privileged 
members of society who had overextended themselves in the financial markets” (42). 
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Writing in 2009, the psychoanalyst Robert D. Stolorow, author of Trauma and Human 
Existence (2007), defines “our current economic crisis” as a “collective trauma” (par. 1). 
Researchers have also assembled empirical evidence to the effect that deaths from 
illnesses known to be more prevalent among individuals exposed to traumatic stress rise 
in societies undergoing systemic financial crises (see James, 137). Fatal cases of heart 
disease and cancer, for example, increased markedly in New York City (where investors 
in the stock market were disproportionately located) between 1929 and 1932. As Harold 
James comments, “It is clear that the financial panic was accompanied by a rise in 
physiological stress, which was a reaction to the sense that the future consisted literally 
and psychically of loss and renunciation” (137-38). In a survey gauging reactions to the 
1987 Black Monday crash, symptoms associated with traumatic stress, such as difficulty 
concentrating, sweaty palms, tightness in the chest, and rapid pulse, were reported by 
over 20 per cent of the individual investors who responded and more than 40 per cent of 
the institutional investors (Shiller, 11). 
These studies invite further investigation into the distribution across different 
professions, classes, genders, ethnicities, and regions of the traumatic symptoms 
identified, and prompt comparison between the prevalence and severity of these 
symptoms and those generated by other forms of social dislocation. They raise questions, 
too, over whether the traumatic effects of specifically financial crises can be 
distinguished from those stemming from the wider economic problems (bankruptcy, 
unemployment, foreclosure, etc.) which often follow stock market crashes and bank 
insolvencies. Important as they are, these secondary issues, however, assert themselves so 
readily only if the question with which I began is interpreted as asking something like, 
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“are the effects of financial crises consistent with prevailing clinical diagnostic and social 
scientific definitions of trauma?” Other, more formal and philosophical issues come to 
the fore if, instead, it is understood that the question at stake is whether a financial crisis 
constitutes a trauma in the distinct and precise sense theorized by Jacques Lacan: an 
encounter with the Real.
1
 
Lacan offers this theorization in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis, his seminar of 1964. There, he introduces the concept of the tuché, which 
he borrows from Aristotle on accidental causality and “translates” as “the encounter with 
the real” (1981, 53, italics in original). In psychoanalysis, Lacan explains, “the function 
of the tuché, of the real as encounter,” finds its privileged form in “the trauma” (55). 
Because, for Lacan, the Real is fundamentally incompatible with, and therefore cannot be 
punctually assimilated to, the symbolic codes that structure subjectivity, the traumatic 
encounter is “essentially the missed encounter” (55); yet the effects of this encounter on 
the patterns of signification woven by the subject are continually apparent. As Slavoj 
Žižek comments, “the Real is the shock of a contingent encounter which disrupts the 
automatic circulation of the symbolic mechanism; … a traumatic encounter which ruins 
the balance of the symbolic universe of the subject” (2008, 192). Precisely as an 
“irruption of a total contingency, the traumatic event is nowhere given in its positivity,” 
but it “produces a series of structural effects (displacements, repetitions, and so on)” 
which manifest themselves as “distortions of the symbolic structure” (193, 182). 
Answering the question of whether a financial crisis constitutes a trauma in this 
Lacanian sense yields several major insights. Firstly, it provides a means of assessing the 
commonplace claim that such crises occur when an “unreal” financial system comes up 
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against some unyielding point of resistance in the “real economy.” Exactly how “real” (or 
Real) is this “real economy”? Lacan’s categories bring some precision to what is often a 
vague and nebulous discourse (ironically, given its ostensible emphasis on the stubbornly 
concrete). Conversely, and more significantly, an alternate theorization of the Real makes 
it possible to see that the traumatic status of a financial crisis lies not so much in its 
exposure of the insubstantial domain of the markets to the weight and inertia of real, 
material things, but rather in its revelation of the weirdly implacable character of this 
very symbolic domain itself. As my elaboration of this theoretical position will show, 
financial crises are traumatic events because they demonstrate that capital – the intangible 
medium of social existence – not only possesses a destructive power comparable to all 
but the most cataclysmic material objects or processes, but also poses a unique challenge 
to apprehension and representation. As we will see, trauma theorists have enumerated 
various historical circumstances under which encounters with the Real are staged, but 
financial crises are qualitatively distinct from these other forms of iconic traumatic event 
in that the damage they inflict on symbolic structures derives not from material violence, 
but from a violence that is itself purely symbolic. This essay thus makes a critical 
intervention in psychoanalytic trauma theory, by presenting financial crises as evidence 
that the field has too readily reduced the Real to the material; but it also aims to 
contribute to economic thought by demonstrating the capacity of psychoanalytic theory to 
elucidate some of the more enigmatic features of finance capital itself. It posits the idea 
that the recent convulsions of the global financial system arise from the intensification of 
logics of automation and abstraction already in place at least as far back as the early 
twentieth century (and in many ways integral to finance capital as such), and attempts to 
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offer a theorization of financial crisis that captures some of the common characteristics of 
a number of individual crises from across the last century. 
 
“The Black Light of the Oil Well”: The Materiality of Crises 
As I have already intimated, from the theoretical perspective adopted by this essay, 
global financial markets appear as vast outgrowths of what Lacan calls the symbolic 
order, semiotic fields constituted by the exchange of signs whose values, in Saussurean 
fashion, are established “as an effect of a system of relations,” as Jean-Joseph Goux puts 
it (167-68). Goux and other cultural theorists have argued that since the late nineteenth 
century these financial sign-structures have gradually lost a referential relation to 
underlying material conditions. Goux writes: “the value of the stock market security 
appears as an emanation of instantaneous global interrelations rather than inhering in 
what is referred to as ‘real value’ or a ‘factual value’ that has some basis in an ‘objective 
foundation’” (167). For Brian Rotman, the “reflexivity” of the “money sign” of 
contemporary finance capital (what he terms “xenomoney”) is demonstrated by “its 
independence … from the physically determined constraints of underlying trade” (1987, 
96). According to Mark C. Taylor, as a result of “the displacement of the industrial, 
productive, or real economy by the financial economy” from the 1970s onward, “the 
economy became a play of floating signifiers whose relations to ‘real’ referents grew ever 
more tenuous” (142). Fredric Jameson contends that with the hegemony of globalized 
finance, “money capital has reached its ultimate dematerialization, as messages which 
pass instantaneously from one nodal point to another across the former globe, the former 
material world” (1997, 260). And Jean Baudrillard, describing this phenomenon in 
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characteristically poetic terms, claims that, “the hyper-realization of big finance capital 
[is] orbitalized above our heads on a course quite beyond our grasp, and a course which 
is … also beyond the grasp of reality itself…. The billions of dollars of speculative 
capital have become a satellite-heap, revolving endlessly around the planet” (23, 24). As 
Andreas Langenohl suggests, such views of financial markets posit a “detachment” thesis 
(7), whose “baseline … can be summarized as follows: in informational capitalism, trade 
is primarily trade with symbols, escapes the limitations of space, creates or destroys 
capital in real time, and functions independently of the somewhat retarded accumulation 
logic of industrial capitalism” (6). 
Some theorists, however, acknowledge that financial markets ultimately remain 
“embedded” (to use Langenohl’s term [6]) in underlying structures. Mark C. Taylor, for 
example, observes that though the economy may become “increasingly spectral until it is 
virtually nothing but the play of signifiers endlessly recycling in recursive loops that are 
unmoored from what was once called the ‘real’ economy,” “the real … does not simply 
disappear but is temporarily repressed and eventually returns to disrupt what had seemed 
to replace it…. When the repressed finally returns, collateral damage is difficult to 
contain” (180). Arthur Kroker likewise argues that the drifting, orbitalized finance capital 
evoked by Baudrillard remains acutely vulnerable to “the accident of the real”: 
 
Everywhere, capitalism is only twenty-four hours away from collapse if 
any part of its real material base stops working in real-time: the collapse of 
the electrical grid, slippages in network routers, glitches in trading systems 
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supporting complex financial transactions, oil that will not stop flowing, 
wage strikes that shut down emergent economies. (par. 4) 
 
Similarly, in a recent critique of theories of finance that pursue the (post)structuralist 
“linguistic turn” – a turn itself “coterminous” with “the era associated with 
financialization in the United States” – Joshua Clover invokes the notion of a “return of 
the real” in relation to capital’s ongoing crises, arguing that it is now apparent that 
“fictitious capital was just that…. [T]he law of value asserted itself with savage clarity, 
fictitious capital was destroyed, jobs were annihilated, exported immiseration refluxing 
toward the economic cores” (113). 
An important distinction must be drawn at this point. When the theorists I have 
quoted mention “the real,” “the real economy,” “real value,” “an objective foundation,” 
“underlying trade,” “the material world,” “reality itself,” or the “real material base,” they 
must be understood as referring not to the Real as such but to that ontological plane that 
Žižek, with reference to Lacan, defines as “the social reality of the actual people involved 
in interaction and in the productive process” (2000, 276). Here, “the materials of nature 
are socially coded and shaped, via the material process of labor, for social use,” 
becoming “fully integrated into the symbolic universe of the social” (Breu, 194). It is the 
realm of what McKenzie Wark (following Georg Lukács and Antonio Negri) terms 
“second nature” – the realm of “labor, capital, [and] commodities,” “production, 
existence, and survival” (176, 178). It is also the realm in which, via the functioning of 
what Lacan calls the imaginary order, subjects form fantasmatic identifications with 
iconic, idealized images that, in the terms of Louis Althusser’s Lacanian-inflected 
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Marxist ideology critique, distort the “relationship of individuals to their real conditions 
of existence” (Althusser, 109). Intractable obstacles or blockages in this material-
symbolic-imaginary domain have indeed, as Kroker and Taylor suggest, caused violent 
convulsions in the “third nature” (Wark, 170-78) made up of the insubstantial 
semioscapes of the financial markets. To take three major examples: the quadrupling of 
the price of oil after the embargo imposed by the Arab petroleum exporting countries in 
October 1973 severely compounded a global bear market in stocks that had begun early 
that year and would run until late 1974, proving ultimately to be the worst downturn since 
World War II; declining world demand for the commodities on which the Russian export 
economy is based (oil, natural gas, metals, timber) was a major contributory factor in the 
nation’s stock market collapse, currency devaluation, and debt default in August 1998, a 
crisis whose systemic reverberations rapidly overwhelmed the massive American hedge 
fund Long-Term Capital Management; and the inability of hundreds of thousands of 
Americans to earn sufficient income to repay the “sub-prime” mortgages they had taken 
out to purchase their homes was, of course, the trigger for the devastating spasm in credit 
markets that began in the summer of 2007 and eventually annihilated some of the most 
prominent institutions on Wall Street and in the City of London and other financial 
centers. 
Far from being exposed to the Real as such, however, in these cases financial 
markets confronted fully social and symbolic (if also in many ways material) 
antagonisms and deadlocks. However, the markets are undoubtedly acutely vulnerable to 
the Real in at least one of its forms: that of a “presymbolic,” “prediscursive,” or 
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“uncoded” materiality (Shepherdson, 28-29; Breu, 194, 197). As Christopher Breu 
comments, this domain 
 
is precisely that which resists and sets limits on, even as it contains the 
resources for, socioeconomic development in any given epoch. It is that 
which has not yet been socialized and symbolically reshaped through labor 
(physical or otherwise), and to the degree that human labor and knowledge 
have not reached the point of being able to socialize it, it represents the 
inert outside or ground of human activity. (197) 
 
The Real, in this sense, is the brute fact of the world as it is given to us by the impersonal 
contingencies of cosmic history – “raw nature” in Wark’s terms (85). It is what Lacan 
gestures toward when he refers to “things which at first run together in the hic et nunc of 
the all in the process of becoming” (2006a, 229), or when he speaks of “the entirety of 
things, ... the totality of the real” (1988a, 262), or of “the primordial real, … a real that 
we do not yet have to limit” (1992, 118); or when, in discussing Freud’s famous dream of 
looking down the gaping throat of his patient, Irma, he invokes “the real lacking any 
possible mediation, … the ultimate real, … the essential object which isn’t an object any 
longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail” 
(1988b, 164). 
 “The irreducible real [sic],” Catherine Belsey writes with reference to 
Lacan, makes itself knowable today “in the form of melting icecaps, floods, [and] forest 
fires” (60). It is manifest, too, in violent natural phenomena such as earthquakes or 
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storms, which, as Bülent Somay remarks, belong “in the realm of the Real” because they 
possess “no ideas or feelings that have a meaning in the symbolic order” (par. 4). 
Two major financial downturns of recent decades that are attributable to such 
irruptions of the Real of nature occurred in Japan. The plunge in the Nikkei stock index 
in January 1995, following the earthquake that devastated the city of Kobe, remains 
particularly notorious because it sealed the fate of the venerable British merchant bank, 
Barings, whose Singapore-based “rogue trader,” Nick Leeson, had secretly made massive 
investments in Nikkei futures contracts, gambling that the index would rise. The 
earthquake and tsunami that struck eastern Japan in March 2011, causing a meltdown at 
the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, also resulted in sharp falls in the Nikkei (and other 
indexes around the world). 
Finance capital is especially sensitive to shortfalls in the supply of “the stored 
solar energy of countless ancient years” (Vadén, par. 24) encased within the earth in the 
form of oil, coal, and gas. Borrowing terminology used by Lacan, Peter Hitchcock 
suggests that “in the real [sic] of oil’s meaning for modernity” lies the potential for “the 
traumatic experience or tuché” (89). Tere Vadén argues that the acute threat to global, 
and especially US, growth posed by the exhaustion of the largest, most accessible, and 
highest quality oil reservoirs over recent decades necessitated a jarring structural shift 
toward debt as the primary economic motor, preparing the way for the credit crisis of the 
last few years. The fall in global equities markets that attended the crunch in 2008 was 
exacerbated by the rising price of oil, a response, in part at least, to the intensifying 
physical constraints on extraction of the fuel. As Vadén puts it: “The financial crisis and 
the oil crisis are closely linked; amidst the lost growth shines the black light of the oil 
 11 
well” (par. 29). Whereas the oil crisis that deepened the financial slump of 1973-74 was a 
thoroughly social phenomenon, a strategic, artificial manipulation of supply in the 
interest of economic and political objectives, that which intensified the credit crunch of 
2007-08 occurred under the pressure of objective conditions that lie in the Real. 
It is apparent, then, that some financial crises are attributable to the force of the 
Real in one of its forms. However, natural disasters or scarcities of natural resources are 
not, in and of themselves, destructive or traumatic from the point of view of the symbolic 
sphere of the financial markets; instead, the negative effects of such phenomena on the 
values of a wide array of financial asset classes reflect the actual and projected damage 
caused to the underlying “real economy” – to production, trade, communications and 
transportation infrastructure, and so on. After the Kobe earthquake, Japanese markets 
held steady for a full week, until ever-mounting estimates of the costs of reconstruction 
finally triggered heavy selling; the markets, that is, registered the event only after it had 
been quantified, coded, and absorbed into the symbolic order. Following the earthquake 
and tsunami in March 2011, the fall in prices was much more rapid but no less mediated, 
since it was the memory of 1995 – still strong in the minds of many investors – which 
conditioned the markets to expect huge reconstruction costs arising from the latest 
disaster. Second nature mediates between first or “raw” nature and third nature. More 
importantly, there are numerous examples of financial crises that have no clear external 
cause, whether in the real economy or in the Real itself. Examples include events as 
significant as the Great Crash of 1929, Black Monday in 1987, and the bursting of the 
new technology or “dot-com” bubble in 2000. Moreover, as the “econophysicist” Didier 
Sornette has argued, even financial crises that can be linked to some specific external 
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factor appear to be driven to a significant extent by dynamics internal to the markets 
themselves: the “cause” is incidental – “a crash occurs because the market has entered an 
unstable phase and any small disturbance may have triggered the instability” – and the 
crisis follows its own, autonomous, self-perpetuating logic (3-4). 
 
“This Self-Engendering Monster”: Capital and the Symbolic Real 
Evidence of the endogenous origins of financial crises need not contradict the notion that 
they entail a traumatic encounter with the Real; rather it may instead strengthen it, if, far 
from simply existing as an inert, presymbolic substance wholly other to the sign-system 
of the markets, the Real is in fact an integral, structural element of that system itself. This 
is precisely the view articulated by Slavoj Žižek in a series of texts over the last decade, 
beginning with The Ticklish Subject (1999). Here, Žižek radicalizes the Marxist notion of 
“real abstraction” to claim that “Capital itself is the Real of our age.” He continues: 
 
when Marx describes the mad self-enhancing circulation of Capital, whose 
solipsistic path of self-fecundation reaches its apogee in today’s meta-
reflexive speculations on futures, it is far too simplistic to claim that the 
spectre of this self-engendering monster … is an ideological abstraction, 
and one should never forget that behind this abstraction there are real 
people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources 
Capital’s circulation is based …. The problem is that this “abstraction” is 
not only in our (financial speculator’s) misperception of social reality – it 
is “real” in the precise sense of determining the structure of the material 
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social processes themselves: the fate of whole strata of populations, and 
sometimes of whole countries, can be decided by the “solipsistic” 
speculative dance of Capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in a 
benign indifference to how its movements will affect social reality…. The 
Real is the inexorable “abstract” spectral logic of Capital which 




This alignment of capital with the Real has proved to be one of Žižek’s most 
contentious claims. When he offers a version of it in dialogue with Judith Butler and 
Ernesto Laclau, his interlocutors are sharply critical. Butler remarks that “this is a 
peculiar way to use the notion of the ‘Real’” (Butler et al., 277), while Laclau complains: 
 
[Žižek] knows as well as I do what the Lacanian Real is; so he should be 
aware that capitalism cannot be the Lacanian Real. The Lacanian Real is 
that which resists symbolization, and shows itself only through its 
disruptive effects. But capitalism as a set of institutions, practices, and so 
on can operate only in so far as it is part of the symbolic order. (Butler et 
al., 291, emphasis in original) 
 
As Matthew Sharpe suggests, however, Žižek’s argument would carry theoretical 
weight if it were possible to conceive of an ontological category that was simultaneously 
Symbolic and Real – a task Žižek has pursued in his attempts to distinguish between 
“different modalities of the Lacanian Real” (Sharpe, 201). The terms Žižek coins in 
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making these distinctions are inelegant – even, as he puts it, “brutal” (Žižek and Daly, 68) 
– but their significance to his project cannot be underestimated. In a detailed treatment of 
this topic, he writes: 
 
There are three modalities of the Real: the “real Real” (the horrifying 
Thing, the primordial object, from Irma’s throat to the Alien); the 
“symbolic Real” (the real as consistency: the signifier reduced to a 
senseless formula, like quantum physics formulas which can no longer be 
translated back into – or related to – the everyday experience of our life-
world); and the “imaginary Real” (the mysterious je ne sais quoi, the 
unfathomable “something” on account of which the sublime dimension 
shines through an ordinary object). (2002, xii) 
 
As Žižek confirms in an interview, “capital is the symbolic Real; this basic neutral 
structure which persists” (Žižek and Daly, 151). Even allowing for this clarification, 
Sharpe rightly notes that, “if Žižek thinks that the capitalist economy is Real, he risks at 
every moment the kind of fetishisation of it that Marx ceaselessly railed against … or … 
a repetition of how political economists themselves would like to see their object” (201, 
emphasis in original). My wager in what follows, however, is that the analytical insights 
to be gained by adopting Žižek’s argument as a heuristic model outweigh the very 
genuine political risks it poses. 
 
“Like an Insensate Thing”: The Automatism of Crises 
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What consequences follow, then, if a financial crisis is conceptualized as a traumatic 
encounter not with the “real Real” of nature but with the “symbolic Real” of capital? 
Firstly, it becomes possible to see how such events might occur not only semi-
autonomously with respect to underlying material conditions, but also somehow 
independently of human agency itself. Both for detached observers and for the very 
individuals issuing and executing the transaction orders, financial crashes have always 
possessed an eerily inhuman, inexorable quality. Even if you are the one selling, and 
thereby contributing to the downturn, the crash is always happening elsewhere, 
anonymously, overtaking you, and the very act of liquidating your assets is not so much a 
calculated decision as an automatic expression of the impersonal, objective, ineluctable 
process in which you are caught up. David Zimmerman describes how, as long ago as the 
end of the nineteenth century, the United States was prone to financial crises that 
“radiated across the chains of exchanges and obligations latticing the market system, 
borne along, seemingly inexorably, by uncanny forms of ‘sympathetic affection’ and 
collective fear” (5). Such phenomena are powerfully evoked by a New York Times 
reporter’s eyewitness account of the events of October 24, 1929 – “Black Thursday.” 
Here, the event is “unreal” – beyond anything that could be imagined, outside of all that 
seemed probable or “realistic” – precisely to the extent to which it lies in the Real: 
 
Around eleven o’clock the deluge broke. 
It came with a speed and ferocity that left men dazed…. From all 
over the country a torrent of selling orders poured onto the floor of the 
Stock Exchange and there were no buying orders to meet it. Within a few 
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moments the ticker service was hopelessly swamped and from then on no 
one knew what was really happening…. 
The animal roar that rises from the floor of the Stock Exchange 
and which on active days is plainly audible in the Street outside, became 
louder, anguished, terrifying…. 
Agonizing scenes were enacted in the customers’ rooms of the 
various brokers. There traders who a few short days before had luxuriated 
in delusions of wealth saw all their hopes smashed in a collapse so 
devastating, so far beyond their wildest fears, as to seem unreal…. 
The market seemed like an insensate thing that was wreaking a 
wild and pitiless revenge upon those who had thought to master it. (Bell, 
114-17) 
 
As John Kenneth Galbraith notes in his classic study of the crash, the downturn 
on the New York Stock Exchange that day was, to a significant extent, automatic in a 
strong sense, since “prices as they fell … kept crossing a large volume of stop-loss orders 
– orders calling for sales whenever a specified price was reached…. Each of these stop-
loss orders tripped more securities into the market and drove prices down farther. Each 
spasm of liquidation thus insured that another would follow” (103). These stop-loss 
orders were rudimentary forms of what is now known as “program trading.” Program 
trading software systems use complex algorithms and enormous processing power to 
perform real-time analysis of shifting market conditions, issuing – and increasingly 
executing – transaction instructions at phenomenal speed. Such systems have been 
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heavily implicated in a number of crashes. On October 19, 1987 – “Black Monday” – for 
example, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 22.6 per cent, its largest ever 
one-day decline, losses were amplified by a program trading-generated feedback loop 
between the New York Stock Exchange and the derivatives market at the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, which pushed prices at both sites relentlessly downward.
3
 On 6 
May 2010, the Dow Jones suffered its worst ever intraday point fall, plunging by around 
1,000 points and wiping nearly $1,000 billion off the value of US shares in a matter of 
minutes, before largely rebounding. A report by US regulators determined that the drop 
was triggered by an unusually large and rapid sell off of futures contracts, which 
prompted computer systems performing an advanced form of program trading – “high-
frequency trading” – to launch into vast waves of selling. Unsurprisingly, given that high-
frequency trading now accounts for 56 percent of total stock market trading (Bowley 
2011, 2), a succession of mini “flash crashes” has since occurred. In September 2010, the 
share price of a Fortune 500 energy company dropped almost 90 percent when “a 
wayward keystroke by a trader somewhere … unleashed a powerful computer algorithm 
that devoured [the] stock in moments” (Bowley 2010, 1). James J. Angel, an expert in 
financial regulation at Georgetown University commented, “It’s like seeing cracks in a 
dam…. One day, I don’t know when, there will be another earthquake” (qtd. in Bowley 
2010, 2). 
These occurrences are particularly striking indications of the symbolic-Real 
nature of capital. As Laclau would stress, they arise from the functioning of “institutions” 
and “practices”: corporations, stock exchanges, regulatory bodies; mathematical research, 
software programming, hardware and infrastructure design. They are by-products of 
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meticulously contrived sets of rules and instructions. Yet the highly formalized 
“computational logics and complex binary languages” (Lenglet, 47) in which these rules 
and instructions are expressed are unintelligible – “senseless,” as Žižek puts it – for all 
but a tiny minority of experts, while the speed and complexity of data processing far 
exceed the capacity of human cognition. Automated trading systems are increasingly 
generating financial crises in which human beings are reduced to the status of mere 
bystanders, while, with relentless mechanical efficiency, the products of scientific and 
technological expertise mutely sift the signifiers of an abstract sign-system, indifferently 
pursuing their programmed course. In one of his visionary essays from the 1990s, the 
British philosopher Nick Land speaks of “silicon viro-finance automatisms,” for which 
even “massively distributed and anonymized human ownership” has become nothing 
more than “vacuously nominal” (337). “What appears to humanity as the history of 
capitalism,” Land suggests in a characteristically audacious inversion, “is an invasion 
from the future by an artificial intelligence space that must assemble itself entirely from 
its enemy’s resources” (338). Though drawn from “the very fibres of our own being,” in 
Fredric Jameson’s words, capital, like “the world of the human age in general,” is 
nonetheless “more alien to us than nature itself” (2009, 608). The “massive Being of 
capital” (Jameson 1991, 48) is a human creation, but we are not at home within it. 
Financial crises reveal this inhuman dimension of capital, a capital that is composed at 
once of abundant, diverse content and pure, formal structure; that is both subjective and 
objective; organic and mechanical; affective and impassive; libidinal and anhedonic; 
human and alien; living and dead; Symbolic and Real. In a crisis, the inner workings of 
capital are exposed to view: the churning of meaningless numbers regulated by a 
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remorseless machinic logic. It is a spectacle as appalling and alienating in its way as that 
of Irma’s throat in Freud’s dream, described by Lacan as “a horrendous discovery … that 
of the flesh one never sees, the foundation of things, the other side of the head, of the 
face … the flesh from which everything exudes, at the very heart of the mystery” (Lacan 
1988b, 154). 
The disturbing awareness that such devastating crises may occur without clear 
external causes and via systems at once human-engineered and yet independent, to a 
significant degree, from human agency and intervention accounts for a widespread and 
persistent desire to attribute the Black Monday crash (against the weight of evidence) to a 
cause that lies in the “real Real” of nature: an extraordinarily severe (by British standards) 
storm that hit the southeast of England on the night of Thursday October 15, 1987.
4
 
According to the theory, the damage caused by the storm led investors to turn temporarily 
bearish about the UK economy and, because it resulted in the closure of all London 
markets the following day, prevented City traders from closing their positions at the end 
of the week; these factors, in turn, unsettled markets around the world (especially in New 
York), precipitating the crash when trading resumed the following Monday.
 
The appeal 
of this theory, I suspect, lies in the fact that it is, ultimately, preferable for our social and 
economic fate to be at the mercy of “raw nature” – tangible, visible, and intelligible, if 
unpredictable and uncontrollable – than a “third nature” that we have constructed but that 
we cannot touch, see, master, or, frequently, comprehend. 
Crises like Black Monday are traumas, in the Lacanian sense, not only because 
they consist of overwhelming encounters with the Real – a Real here hardwired into the 
Symbolic itself – but because they produce warps and distortions in the network of 
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signifiers that constitutes the markets at large. Striking evidence of this phenomenon 
became visible after October 1987 in US (and to a lesser extent other) options markets – 
that is, markets in which investors trade derivative contracts granting the option to buy or 
sell an asset at a given price (the strike price) on, or before, a specified date. As the 
sociologist Donald MacKenzie describes, prior to the crash of ’87, the relationship 
between the strike price and the implied volatility (or extent of price fluctuation) of 
options on the same underlying asset with the same time to expiration date formed a flat 
line on a graph (as the famous Black-Scholes-Merton model of options pricing dictated). 
After Black Monday, however, “the flat-line relationship … disappeared, and was 
replaced by a distinct ‘skew,’” which still persists. On that day, investors learned that 
“stock markets could suddenly fall by previously unthinkable amounts,” threatening “the 
very existence of derivative markets.” It is this “collective trauma,” MacKenzie 
postulates, which “sustains the skew” – an “incorporation into option prices of the 
possibility of a catastrophic but low-probability event.” Prices, in other words, “have 
incorporated the fear that the 1987 crash would be repeated” (202, 206, 205, emphasis in 
original).
 
In Lacanian terms, this lasting wrinkle in the symbolic fabric of the markets is 
consistent with the functioning of the “automaton, the return, the coming-back, the 
insistence of the signs” (Lacan 1981, 53), whose role it is endlessly, robotically to 
register the tuché, the rupturing, traumatizing encounter with the Real. 
 
“Like a Flood or an Earthquake”: The Unrepresentability of Crises 
An understanding of financial crises as emanations of the symbolic Real helps, then, to 
account for their weirdly agentless, implacable, phantasmatic, and therefore profoundly 
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disturbing qualities. It is useful, too, in theorizing the extreme difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of representing such crises, both verbally and visually. As I have suggested, 
we are concerned here with symbolic crises – crises of signs. A representation of a 
financial crisis as such would thus consist of signs that represent other signs, rather than 
any form of material object or action. What is the nature of the financial signs that are to 
be represented? In the seminar on Poe’s “The Purloined Letter,” Lacan describes money 
as “the signifier that most thoroughly annihilates every signification” (2006b, 27). 
Echoing this remark in an interview about the global financial crisis, Jacques-Alain 
Miller observes that “money is a signifier without signification, which kills all 
significations” (par. 4). Such statements would seem to contradict a seminal moment in 
the formulation of structural linguistics, when Ferdinand de Saussure illustrates the 
interdependence of the “vertical” relationship between signifier and signified and the 
“horizontal” relationship between one signifier and another through a monetary analogy: 
“to determine what a five-franc piece is worth one must … know: (1) that it can be 
exchanged for a fixed quantity of a different thing, e.g. bread; and (2) that it can be 
compared with a similar value of the same system, e.g. a one-franc piece, or with coins of 
another system (a dollar, etc.)” (115). While a coin may have an ambit of familiar 
significations (in the form of everyday commodities) and a readily intelligible value, 
however, the monetary signifiers of finance capital fail to signify, much as Lacan and 
Miller suggest. A share price, a stock index figure, a futures contract, a collateralized debt 
obligation are (or are composed of) abstract signifiers, lacking in communicative capacity, 
which derive from clusters of other signifiers, themselves distinctly opaque, blank, and 
inexpressive. These signifiers’ notional connotation of some ultimate ground of value 
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embedded in the landscape of commodity production and consumption is, even for highly 
informed individuals, almost impossible to discern. Whether symbolically, iconically, or 
indexically, they possess little or no power to evoke a signified. Like the “senseless” 
formulae described by Žižek, they “can no longer be translated back into – or related to – 
the everyday experience of our life-world.” As Richard Sieburth remarks of the 
numismatic symbols that pervade Ezra Pound’s late cantos, these are “signifiers without 
signifieds” (144); they are material signifiers, whose fluctuations, interactions, and 
substitutions recall the formalist mathematician David Hilbert’s famous description of his 
discipline as consisting of manipulating “meaningless marks on paper” (qtd. in Rotman 
2000, 6) (today, in the case of the financial markets, “meaningless marks on screen” 
would be more precise). In a crisis, the signifiers on the stock ticker or balance sheet 
change exceptionally rapidly, but assume no greater significatory scope. An authentic 
representation of a financial crisis would thus be not simply a representation of a pre-
existing symbolic field, but of a symbolic field that itself lacks discernable significations 
– a field of inscrutable, indecipherable code. 
The challenge to representation is greater still, however. If, to the extent to which 
the monetary signifiers of finance capital lie in the Symbolic, they tend to “annihilate 
every signification,” then, to the extent to which they lie in the Real, they “resist 
symbolization absolutely” (Lacan 1988a, 66). Not only do they not signify, they cannot 
be signified. Financial crises are unusual, if not unique, in being disasters in which no 
thing is destroyed. There is, ultimately, nothing in the crisis to represent because that 
which is destroyed lacks all substance: it is simply capital in its purest, most abstract, 
immaterial, spectral – and thus, for Žižek, paradoxically Real – form. At the core of a 
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financial crisis is an absence, a gap, an empty space – not the contingent loss of an earlier 
plenitude, however, but a constitutive lack, a lack that the loss of the crash merely renders 
starkly apparent. The trauma of the crisis entails a vertiginous glimpse into this abyssal 
dimension of social reality, an emptiness at the centre of things that everyone knows to be 
there but that, in the ordinary course of events, is concealed by the apparent solidity and 
assumed exchangeability of the abstract units of value that mediate our social existence. 
The symbolic resources available to us are very limited in their capacity to 
describe or depict the loss of something that never existed, physically, in the first place. 
We try to cover up this ontological scandal by describing the loss as if it were the very 
thing it is not: a material (particularly natural) disaster, with all its massive tangibility, 
presence, and visibility. Hence those familiar, indispensable, now thoroughly calcified 
metaphors, many of which have featured in this essay, both in my own prose and in the 
quotations I have extracted: “crash” itself, of course, but also “crunch,” “convulsion,” 
“spasm,” “collapse,” “crack,” “reverberation,” “radiation,” “smash,” “deluge,” “torrent,” 
and “earthquake,” as well as “shock wave,” “meltdown,” “eruption,” “tsunami,” 
“hurricane,” and numerous others. For an impression of the longevity and ubiquity of 
vocabulary of this kind, even in highly reflexive discursive fields, consider some 
prominent examples of the intellectual and literary response to the Great Crash of 1929: 
Edmund Wilson, for instance, concluding his 1932 article “The Literary Consequences of 
the Crash” with the words, “the slump was like a flood or an earthquake, and it was long 
before many things righted themselves”(499); the leftist art collective the John Reed Club 
of New York (named after the American journalist and communist activist) describing 
the crash, in their Draft Manifesto of the same year, as falling on the heads of the liberal 
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intelligentsia “like a thunderbolt” (420); or Thomas Wolfe in 1934’s You Can’t Go Home 
Again – the most notable and extended fictional treatment of the crash – referring to 
“faint tremors” that culminate in a “thunderous crash,” characterizing the “collapse of the 
Stock Market” as “like the fall of a gigantic boulder into the still waters of a lake,” 
speaking of “the mighty roar of tumbling stocks in Wall Street,” which echo “throughout 
the nation,” and finding in falling share values “the initial explosion which in the course 
of the next few years was to set off a train of lesser explosions all over the land” (246, 
120, 253, 281, 282). Similar imagery features in visual representations. Probably the best 
known depiction of the ’29 crash by a visual artist, James N. Rosenberg’s lithograph Dies 
Irae (Oct 29), an immediate response, produced at the height of the panic, depicts what 
would come to be known as “Black Tuesday” as a “day of wrath” on which the Stock 
Exchange, Trinity Church, and the rest of Wall Street crumble and collapse beneath a 
thunderous, lightning-torn sky, while desperate, distorted, Munch-esque figures swarm 




Figure 1. James N. Rosenberg, Dies Irae (Oct 29). 1929. Lithograph on paper. 
Smithsonian American Art Museum, museum purchase. 
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Remarkably, given the event’s “world-historical” importance (James, 131), the 
wide scholarly interest in the art and literature of the Great Depression, and the inherent 
richness of the textual and visual material in question, the cultural reaction to the specific 
shock of the Great Crash has received little critical attention. The crisis of representation 
apparent in the cultural response to history’s greatest crisis of capitalism, moreover, has 
particular resonance amid our present conjuncture, when the question of the figurative 
capacity of art and literature in the face of financial disaster is once again of urgent 
interest.
5
 The photographic archive spawned by the crash of ’29 is especially intriguing 
because photography, in its inherent literalism, poses particularly starkly the question of 
how to represent a catastrophe that is essentially invisible and immaterial. One thinks, 
most obviously, of the iconic press shots of crowds thronging Wall Street as the orgy of 
selling played out inside the Stock Exchange. As Elliott V. Bell describes, 
 
the streets were crammed with a mixed crowd – agonized little speculators, 
walking aimlessly outdoors because they feared to face the ticker and the 
margin clerk; sold-out traders, morbidly impelled to visit the scene of their 
ruin; inquisitive individuals and tourists, seeking by gazing at the exteriors 
of the Exchange and the big banks to get a closer view of the national 
catastrophe. (116) 
 
Even if their gaze had somehow penetrated the walls of the Exchange, however, and 
beheld the shouting, gesticulating, jostling brokers, the true dimensions of the “national 
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catastrophe” would have remained invisible. Rather, it is as if the crowd congregates 
precisely in an attempt to materialize the event, to generate a scene whose recording will 
testify to the magnitude of the crisis. In a shot of the steps of Federal Hall taken on 
October 24, the massed ranks of the crowd uniformly face the camera square on, aware 
that they are being photographed (Figure 2). Some individuals are plainly posing self-
consciously; some even wave jocularly in the direction of the camera. The image as a 
whole is a strange blend of the spontaneous and the staged. The crowd understands that 
its function is to render the invisible visible. 
 
 
Figure 2. Crowd outside Federal Hall, Wall Street, October 24, 1929 (“Black Thursday”). 
Copyright Bettman Collection/Corbis. 
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 A photograph taken a week later, in a London club, could hardly be more 
different: here, a young clerk with headphones chalks up stock prices as they are relayed 
from New York, while groomed, well-dressed men look on impassively from leather 
chairs (Figure 3). This, perhaps, is what a financial crisis “really” looks like: nothing 
more than marks on a board being mechanically inscribed, erased, and re-inscribed; the 
signifiers relentlessly working themselves out. The image dramatizes what Karyn Ball, in 
a compelling theorization of finance capital from a Derridean perspective, describes as 
“the autonomous agency of textual materiality” – “the agency of signifiers” themselves 
(14, 7, italics in original). Viewing this photograph, we witness a “linguistic” 
phenomenon in the sense of the term articulated by Claire Colebrook in an analysis of 
contemporary politics and economics through the work of Paul de Man: “inhuman forces, 
impersonal relations, and machinic systems that [cannot] be reduced to speech or already 




Figure 3. Clerk chalking up prices from the New York Stock Exchange at a club run by 
St Phalle Ltd., London, October 31, 1929. Copyright Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis. 
 
A further set of images that, in its own strange, accidental way, memorializes the 
crash with remarkable power was taken by the photojournalist Margaret Bourke-White 
during an advertising assignment for the First National Bank of Boston. Ironically, given 
their origins, the photographs would appear the following year in magazine 








Figure 5. Advertisement for the First National Bank of Boston, Fortune, November 1930. 
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Bourke-White describes the circumstances of the photo shoot in her memoir: 
 
The event took place in late fall. I was in Boston at the time, doing a job 
for the First National Bank: a series of architectural photographs of their 
newly decorated lobby, which would run as ads in forthcoming issues of 
Fortune…. 
I had so many pictures to take to finish up the bank job that I 
decided to work at night. The chief electrician of the bank generously 
consented to stick with me the whole night through….  
Expecting to see the bank lobby deserted after nightfall, we were 
astounded to find it full of vice-presidents and other bank officials running 
about, conferring, leaning over their desks, darting here and there with 
memos. Since my time exposures in the cavernous bank lobby had to be 
very long, I found this quite a nuisance, as I had to cap my lens every time 
a vice-president dashed in front of the camera…. 
Finally one vice-president paused to talk back. As though he were 
addressing a very little girl indeed, he said, “I guess you don’t know, the 
bottom dropped out of everything.” The bottom dropped out of what? 
“The stock market! Haven’t you read the papers?” I hadn’t…. “They’re 
carrying everything away in a basket.” … 
Years later … I happened to tell this incident to [Time Editor] Roy 
Larsen. “To think,” he said, “you must have been the only photographer in 
the whole United States who was inside a bank that night.”  
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History was pushing her face into the camera, and here was I, 
turning my lens the other way. (71-72) 
 
Bourke-White’s striking final sentence calls to mind the model of trauma 
theorized by Cathy Caruth (following Freud and Lacan), in which the traumatic event is 
somehow missed by the subject – “not assimilated or experienced fully at the time” – and 
persists, unprocessed, in the unconscious (1995, 4). If, however, History, as Fredric 
Jameson famously argued, can be identified with the Real (1981, 35, 81-82; 1982, 384-
94), then it would not have been found in the scurrying movements of the bankers, on 
which Bourke-White regrets not having had the presence of mind to train her camera. 
There is a missed encounter here, but it is not a failure to point the lens in the right 
direction or to shoot the right things; rather, it is a lack of cognizance of what the camera 
itself is recording. As Ulrich Baer argues, photography has an  
 
ability to confront the viewer with a moment that had the potential to be 
experienced but perhaps was not. In viewing such photographs we are 
witnessing a mechanically recorded instant that was not necessarily 
registered by the subject’s own consciousness. This possibility that 
photographs capture unexperienced events creates a striking parallel 




By pure chance, Bourke-White’s camera captures the moment of an encounter with the 
Real, an encounter that she herself – on whom the “significance of the stock market crash 
[is] lost” (72) – does not fully register. However, while the “real Real” would have left its 
indexical imprint on the image in the form of some obtrusive material thing (Roland 
Barthes’ punctum),6 the symbolic Real encountered here leaves no visible trace. Bourke-
White’s images record an instant in which the symbolic Real of capital – the condition of 
possibility for the existence of the bank’s grand, opulent, vaulted interior – has come to 
endanger the institution’s very survival. But the disaster taking place at this moment, 
though of immense proportions, is intangible and abstract, and causes no immediate 
material damage. In Maurice Blanchot’s words, it is a disaster that “ruins everything, all 
the while leaving everything intact” (1).7 
Writing amid the “crisis of capitalist industry” (507) initiated by the Great Crash, 
Walter Benjamin, in his “Little History of Photography” (1931), quotes Bertolt Brecht’s 
observation that “less than ever does the mere reflection of reality reveal anything about 
reality. A photograph of the Krupp [steel] works or the AEG [Allgemeine Elekticitäts 
Gesellschaft/General Electric Company] tells us next to nothing about those 
institutions…. The reification of human relations – the factory, say – means that they are 
no longer explicit” (Benjamin, 526).8 If capital’s systemic forces are occluded in 
photographs of industrial spaces, there is nonetheless, as Fredric Jameson suggests,  an 
extent to which the massive mechanical structures that dominate such environments form 
a kind of “shorthand to designate that enormous properly human and anti-natural power 
of dead human labor stored up in our machinery”; such machines are “still visible 
emblems, sculptural nodes of energy which give tangibility and figuration to the motive 
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energies of that [early twentieth-century]  moment of modernization” (1991, 35, 36). 
How much less illustrative or expressive, in contrast, are images of a space – the bank, 
say – in which the economic processes in question necessarily lack any kind of self-
emblematizing visual form? That being said, however, a remark of Benjamin’s from 
elsewhere in the same essay helps to explain the power that Bourke-White’s photographs 
nonetheless possess: 
 
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter how carefully posed his 
subject, the beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for 
the tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has 
(so to speak) seared the subject, to find the inconspicuous spot where in 
the immediacy of that long-forgotten moment the future nests so 
eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. (510) 
 
We search Bourke-White’s still, somber, timeless compositions in vain for the “spark” 
that would index the singularity of their exposure to the Real. If the “spark of 
contingency” is absent from the images themselves, however, it enhalos them with an 
incandescent glow, for while they might have been taken on any night, fate dictated that 
they should have been taken on that night, endowing them with an extraordinary charge 
of historicity. By chance, they record the moment of the crash, even as they testify to its 
ultimate unrecordability, and, as such, issue an exceptionally eloquent appeal to posterity. 
This appeal is primarily experiential – we feel the electrifying touch of a momentous 
historical event – but what these photographs tell us, too, is that, given the impossibility 
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of representing a financial crisis as such, the most effective figurations of such 
occurrences are likely to be those that – obliquely, fortuitously – capture something – 
some scene, moment, or image – which is not the crisis itself, but which nonetheless 
communicates an impression of the event’s awesome power and magnitude. 
 
Conclusion: Which Real Returns? 
Bourke White’s photographs, the Great Crash that they so resonantly memorialize, and 
the wider phenomenon of financial crisis explored in this essay demand a 
reconceptualization of the “traumatic turn” taken by much critical thought over the last 
two decades, and, in particular, of the notion of a “return of the Real” – a term that owes 
its currency to Hal Foster’s 1996 book of the same name, but is also closely associated 
with the work of Cathy Caruth, Dominick LaCapra, and Michael Rothberg, among 
others.
9
 Invariably, the Real that is understood to stage a return in this body of work is, in 
Žižek’s terms, the “real Real”: natural disasters, occasionally, but more often abject states 
of bodily violence, wounding, atrocity, and death. The Lacanian definition of trauma as 
an inherently missed, absent, or effaced encounter has made it possible to analyze texts 
and images in relation to “real things in the world” (Foster, 128) – countering 
poststructuralism’s alleged semiotic idealism and fixation on the autonomous play of the 
signifier – while avoiding a return to “realist representation as usual” (Rothberg, 106). 
This attempt to encourage the humanities “to reconnect with historical violence” without 
“falling into the pitfalls of a naive historicism” (Stonebridge, 26) is both ethically and 
philosophically admirable. What it overlooks, however, is that, not just today, but in 
earlier eras too, some of the most paralyzing, socially destabilizing events are themselves, 
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first and foremost, semiotic, textual phenomena; they emanate not from the real Real but 
from the symbolic Real. To draw a comparison that carries particular resonance in critical 
thought: while that ultimate form of material annihilation – planetary nuclear war, the 
defining Real of contemporary life for Walter A. Davis (130-31) – has not (yet) occurred, 
and hence continues to be, as Jacques Derrida famously put it, “fabulously textual, 
through and through” (23) (that is, merely discursive, symbolic, representational), 
financial crises stand as major, global events that occur with alarming regularity but 
themselves remain, precisely, “fabulously textual.” Their material consequences, 
however, are all too palpable. As Žižek says, the “abstraction” of capital is “‘real’ in the 
precise sense of determining the structure of the material social processes themselves: the 
fate of whole strata of populations, and sometimes of whole countries, can be decided by 
the ‘solipsistic’ speculative dance of Capital.” This lesson is being relearned in the wake 
of the global credit crunch, and it is no wonder that the default point of historical 
comparison for this crisis is the Great Crash of 1929, “a very major event,” whose “really 
world-historical consequences [include] the Great Depression, [and] even perhaps the 
Second World War” (James 131). In a discussion of “the crisis of ’29” in Libidinal 
Economy (1974), Jean-François Lyotard testifies vividly to the traumatic power of the 
symbolic Real when he observes that under the pressure of mere “economic signs” – 
“even the most abstract, and, it seems, the most innocent in the economist’s eyes” – the 
“social ‘body’ … can fall apart, be taken to pieces, and go to pulp for a long time (right 
up until 1950-5, that is a quarter century counted on the clock of Weltgeschichte), and 
atrociously (millions and millions of deaths, millions of ruins)” (229, emphasis in 
original). 
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Since the fall of 2011, a concerted attempt to consign such devastating crises to 
history has been initiated everywhere from New York to London to Seoul to Sydney. 
What the “Occupy” movement, as it has become known, faces, however, is not only the 
bitter resistance of vested interests in business and government, but also the peculiar 
intractability, inertia, and autonomy of capital itself: capital possesses its own abstract 
and impersonal logic, irreducible to the individuals or institutions who take their turns in 
enacting its protocols. Under these circumstances, what would a truly 
transformational challenge to the rule of finance capital look like? In this connection, it is 
at the very least intriguing to note that, amid attempts by campaigners to lay claim to 
the spatial terrain of financial centers across the world, and to the symbolic and 
ideological terrain of public discourse, allies of the Occupy movement have sought to 
intervene at the level of the very code in which contemporary finance capital is 
instantiated, thereby disrupting and rerouting capital’s seemingly hardwired circuits. 
Most notably, in December 2011 a splinter group linked to the “hacktivist” collective 
Anonymous used credit card details obtained from a US security company to make 
donations to a number of prominent charities (see Williams). While minor in scale (the 
hackers claimed to have expropriated a “mere” $500,000) and, in practical terms, likely 
counterproductive (since the charities were left with the time-consuming and potentially 
expensive prospect of repaying the funds), the campaign, dubbed “Operation Robin 
Hood” by supporters, had clear propaganda value, and, more significantly, materialized 
on the far horizon the possibility of a truly colossal, universal, and uncontainable 
redistribution of wealth, in which the vast drifts of capital stockpiled in a small scattering 
of financial strongholds would be strewn, thinly but evenly, over the surface of the planet. 
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Of course, such a thoroughgoing redistribution of immaterial wealth (unlike a large-scale 
expropriation of material property possessing innate use value) might, in fact, serve 
merely to render that wealth meaningless and worthless (to annihilate the only value it 
carries, exchange value), meaning that a strategy of this kind would only be effective in 
genuinely shifting the global balance of wealth as a campaign of targeted, 
covert, guerrilla-style strikes within the existing system of values, rather than as a mass, 
full-frontal assault against that system. Conversely, to decisively derail the automated 
mechanisms of contemporary financial exchange would not necessarily be to eradicate 
the automatism that is capital accumulation itself, for it is equally possible to imagine 
(along lines sketched by Manuel De Landa in relation to the historical emergence of 
capitalism) the dispersed wealth of the world spontaneously reassembling and 
reconsolidating itself into something very much resembling a capitalist 
system. Whichever of these future scenarios seems more plausible, it is in any case 
conceivable that, even as the struggle over the future of the global economy plays out 
in the streets, on the web, and in newspapers, talks shows, and the pages 
of scholarly journals, the most momentous battles may be fought far from sight, between 
ever more sophisticated strings of code, tracking one another silently across the world’s 
networks and databanks. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
I am grateful to colleagues in the English departments at the University of Amsterdam, 
New York University, the University of Northumbria, and the University of Westminster 
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for opportunities to present earlier versions of portions of this essay. I also wish to thank 
Cultural Critique’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. 
1
 Though Lacan’s translators maintain the lower case form (“the real”) in their 
translations of le réel, I follow recent commentators (most notably Slavoj Žižek, with 
whom this essay is in particularly close dialogue) in capitalizing the term where a 
specifically Lacanian usage is intended. 
2
 Žižek’s argument in this passage reverses the hierarchy implicit in Wark’s model of 
three “natures,” such that “third nature” takes precedence over second. As we will see in 
a moment, however, Žižek’s enumeration of three “Reals” reveals his and Wark’s 
frameworks to be broadly compatible, in that there is a strong affinity (if not a direct 
correspondence) between Žižek’s “real Real,” “imaginary Real,” and “symbolic Real,” 
on the one hand, and Wark’s first, second, and third natures, on the other. 
3
 For a detailed account and analysis of the role of program trading in the crash, see 
MacKenzie (179-210). A highly readable, accessible treatment of similar material is Fox 
(227-44). 
4
 On this linkage, see, for example, the documentary Explosive 80s: The Storm and the 
Crash (Channel 4, 16 May 2005). Evidence of a possible, if slight, “hurricane effect” is 
noted in Limmack and Ward (275, 287). As well as enduring in the popular memory of 
Black Monday as a privileged causal factor, the storm has also been symbolically 
overcoded in fiction as an extended metaphor both for the crash itself and, as Joseph 
Brooker notes, for the wider “social upheaval” of Britain in the 1980s. Brooker mentions 
Tim Lott’s novel Rumours of a Hurricane (2002) (see Brooker, 10 n. 9); other examples 
include the novels High Latitudes by James Buchan (1996) and Where the Light Remains 
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by Hayden Gabriel (2003), the travelogue Lights Out for the Territory (1997) by Iain 
Sinclair, and the BBC Two drama Our Friends in the North (episode 8, “1987,” March 4, 
1996). In these narratives, it is as if (as I will suggest shortly with respect to the Great 
Crash of 1929) the unrepresentability of the crisis makes it necessary to depict a different 
– more visibly destructive – event in its place, as a kind of substitute or surrogate. 
5
 For some suggestive reflections on (specifically visual) figurations of the credit crisis, 
see Power and Sayeau. 
6
 Barthes refers explicitly to the Lacanian Real in Camera Lucida (4); on the concept of 
the punctum, see 27, 40-49, 51-59, 96. For an analysis that connects the Real and the 
punctum, see Foster (132-36). 
7
 Steven Shaviro quotes Blanchot’s aphorism in reference to the recent credit crisis (par. 
5). 
8
 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of this essay for pointing out the 
resonance of Brecht’s comments in this context. 
9
 See, principally, Foster; Caruth, ed. 1995; Caruth 1996; LaCapra; Rothberg. 
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